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Abstract I argue that disposition ascriptions—claims like ‘the glass is fragile’—are
semantically equivalent to possibility claims: they are true when the given object
manifests the disposition in at least one of the relevant possible worlds.
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1 Introduction
Some things are fragile. Some people are irascible. We often ascribe dispositions to
objects. But when is a given disposition ascription true? For instance, when are
claims such as
(1) The glass is fragile.
(2) Bill is irascible.
true?
In this paper I put forward the view that disposition ascriptions (henceforth, DAs)
are semantically equivalent to possibility claims, and thus can be understood as
introducing existential quantification over a given set of possible worlds. For
instance, (1) is true just in case there is at least one relevant possible world in which
the glass gets broken easily. Call this the Possibility View.
The standard counterfactual account of DAs is significantly different from the
Possibility View. It interprets (1)–(2) as concealed counterfactual conditionals (see,
inter alia, Goodman 1954; Quine 1960). For instance, it says that (1) is true just in
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case, if the glass were struck, it would break. Notoriously, the account faces several
counterexamples. So-called finks, masks and reverse-finks, among others, put the
counterfactual account in a corner.1
Faced with counterexamples, one has at least two options. One option is to try
and develop a more sophisticated version of the standard account.2 But whether
some sort of counterfactual account of DAs will ultimately be successful remains to
be seen. A second option is to conclude that the prospect for counterfactual accounts
of DAs look grim. From this perspective, counterexamples provide us with
motivation for a change of route. This paper puts forward one such alternative
route—the Possibility View.3
Some authors have already started to make steps towards options in the vicinity
of the Possibility View. Manley and Wassermann (2007, 2008) suggest that
something has a given disposition just in case it manifests that disposition in a
suitable proportion of relevant cases. They thereby connect the possession of
dispositions with a modal force weaker than necessity. Vetter (2014, 2015) claims
that several DAs have a modal force close to standard possibility. For instance, to
her (1) is true just in case the glass breaks in a relatively low proportion of cases.
She adds that some DAs, like ‘the glass is breakable’, are possibility claims. Yet
neither of these authors goes as far as to see that all DAs are actually possibility
claims—as the Possibility View says. Within the linguistics literature, Angelika
Kratzer (1981, 2012, 2013) suggests in passing that something along the lines of the
Possibility View might be correct. This paper develops such a view, offers
independent and novel arguments in its support, and shows why it scores better than
alternatives in its vicinity.4
I first elucidate the basic tenets of the Possibility View and give an argument to
motivate its pursuit (Sects. 2–4). Then I develop the view in detail (Sects. 5–8). I
conclude by addressing two potential objections (Sect. 9).
1 A simple counterexample to the standard view which counts as a mask case: a glass is packed in such a
way that if it were struck it would not break; even so, the glass seems fragile. Since the standard
counterfactual account says that the glass is fragile just in case it would break when struck, the glass
comes out as not fragile. For further counterexamples see, Martin (1994), Bird (1998) and Contessa
(2016), inter alia.
2 Cf. Lewis (1997a), Choi (2006), Bonevac et al. (2011) and Contessa (2013, 2016). For objections, see
inter alia Bird (1998), Yli-Vakkuri (2010), Manley and Wassermann (2008) and Vetter
(2011, 2014, 2015).
3 For an alternative that is distant from the Possibility View, see Fara (2005), where DAs are regarded as
equivalent to habituals; for an objection, see Yli-Vakkuri (2010).
4 Shortly before publishing this paper, I was informed that Maier (forthcoming) suggests an account of
DAs which is also in the vicinity of the Possibility View; I am sorry I cannot compare and contrast our
two views in the present piece. We both presented independently achieved results on DAs at the
Workshop on the Morphological, Syntactic and Semantic Aspects of Dispositions in Stuttgart in June
2015. For other interesting papers given at that conference, see Martin et al. (2016).
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2 The view and its scope
The expression ‘disposition ascription’ is not used homogeneously in the debate.
Here is a use of ‘disposition ascription’ I do not adopt in this paper. Some authors
call claims of the form ‘x is disposed to u’ disposition ascriptions.5 The reason I will
not follow this trend is the following. In the literature, the expression ‘…disposed
to…’ is a term of art. It is meant to capture whatever feature an object has in virtue
of its possessing a given disposition.6 My goal here is to shed light on ordinary
dispositional talk. So I will not consider claims of the form ‘x is disposed to u’. This
way I will be sure not to rely on theoretically based intuitions that may come with
these terms of art.
Other authors point out that ordinary dispositional talk involves adjectives such
as ‘fragile’, ‘irascible’ and ‘breakable’.7 I agree with this suggestion, and assume as
a rule of thumb that any adjective ending in -ile/-able/-ible is a dispositional
adjective.8 So on my terminology claims such as sentences of the form
(DA) x is F-able/-ible/-ile.
are disposition ascriptions (DAs).
The account of DAs I put forward is simple enough. It says that all DAs express
possibility, because dispositional adjectives are possibility modals. Given a possible
world semantics:
(Possibility View) ‘x is F-able’ is true iff there is at least one accessible
possible world in which x u-es.9
Here ‘x’ picks up the subject of the DA, ‘F-able’ is the relevant dispositional
adjective, and ‘u’ describes the manifestation of the disposition corresponding to
the dispositional adjective (without necessarily being the lexically correlated
infinitive). The qualification ‘accessible’ indicates that the context selects the modal
5 The trend starts with Lewis (1997a), who is explicitly not interested with ordinary language DAs.
Amongst followers, see Bird (1998), Fara (2005), Manley and Wassermann (2007, 2008) and Steinberg
(2010). Before Lewis, DAs were at the centre of the scene—cf. Goodman (1954), Quine (1960, 1970),
and Mackie (1972), inter alia.
6 As Vetter (2015: 67) points out, ‘disposed to’ often means something like ‘willingly’, or expresses
statistical probability.
7 See esp. Vetter (2014, 2015: 63ff).
8 I consider cases like ‘possible’ and ‘probable’ to be exceptions to this rule, and follow the literature in
assuming that they deserve their own special treatment. I also ignore adjectives whose meaning has been
theoretically stipulated, such as ‘countable’ in mathematics (a set, say, is countable just in case it has the
same cardinality of some subset of the set of natural numbers).
I leave the task of investigating whether further adjectives should qualify as dispositional to future
work. It should also be mentioned that in linguistics the expression ‘dispositional sentences’ is used
differently than in this paper: it is taken to refer to generic sentences such as ‘the printer prints 100 pages
per minute’—cf. Mene´ndez-Benito (2013). Interestingly enough, the view I am about to put forward for
DAs here is analogous to the view Mene´ndez-Benito puts forward for the relevant class of generic
sentences.
9 Kratzer (2007) makes a case for using possible situations instead of possible worlds. In the main text, I
use possible worlds for simplicity—so does Kratzer (1981, 1991, 2012, 2013), inter alia.
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base, namely which possible worlds are accessible from the world of evaluation. In
other words: x is F-able just in case there is a accessible possible world in which
x manifests the given disposition. For instance, consider the claim:
(3) The glass is breakable.
(3) is true just in case there is at least one accessible possible world at which the
glass manifests breakability—namely, it gets broken. Which worlds are accessible
depends on context (see Sect. 5).
Note that the view assumes that there is always an associated verb phrase for
each dispositional predicate. It does not assume that the verbal phrase has to be
etymologically on a par with the predicate in question. It also does not assume that it
is always obvious what that phrase is—at times, some work is needed to figure this
out (see Sects. 6–9).10
It is worth emphasising from the outset that the Possibility View is not a
metaphysical thesis about dispositions. It does not imply, for instance, that
dispositions are reducible to possibility. Nor is it a metaphysical thesis about
modality. It does not imply, for instance, that modality is to be grounded in
dispositions.11 Moreover, the view by itself does not settle whether we should
include dispositions and modality in our metaphysics. Rather, the Possibility View is
a semantic thesis. It clarifies how to understand the DAs that one finds in ordinary
language.
At the same time, the Possibility View does clarify some of the central
assumptions that ordinary speakers make about dispositions when assessing DAs.
For instance, it clarifies that speakers assume—either at an explicit or at an implicit
level—that dispositions have manifestations. Accordingly, the Possibility View can
provide us with a starting point to think about dispositions. Thus if one assumes that,
other things being equal, a metaphysical account of dispositions should accommo-
date the assumptions that ordinary speakers make about dispositions, then the
Possibility View is also a first step towards an account of dispositions. I leave the
potential task of developing such an account to future occasions.12
2.1 Immediate implications
Before expanding and defending the Possibility View, it is worth pausing for a
moment to spell out its immediate implications.
10 We will see how the correct characterization of the manifestation of fragility, for instance, requires a
verbal phrase that also contains adverbial qualifications (see Sects. 2.1, 6). Moreover, for some
dispositional adjectives it is opaque what the associated verbal phrase is (e.g. durable, sizeable) but this
can nonetheless be recovered. To pick the case of ‘durable’, for instance: roughly, something is durable
just in case it lasts long enough (note that the Latin word for ‘to last’ is ‘durare’). Finally, at times the
modal force of some of these dispositional adjectives may appear stronger than possibility (consider for
instance ‘the bill is payable’). I discuss this last kind of cases in Sect. 9.1.
11 Borghini and Williams (2008) and Vetter (2015) argue that the metaphysics of modality is grounded in
dispositions. Borghini and Williams (2008) do not discuss the semantics of DAs which is the focus of this
paper. Vetter (2014, 2015) does consider the semantics of DAs—I discuss her view in Sects. 7.2–8.1.
12 I provide an account of dispositions that is in line with the Possibility View in Aimar (ms).
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The first immediate implication of the Possibility View is the following. If x is
F-able, there is at least one world in which x u-es. In other words: if x has a
disposition, there is at least one relevant possible world in which x manifests that
disposition. Note that the view does not say that something that has a disposition at a
world also manifests that disposition at that very world. So it allows that claims such
as
(4) The glass is fragile even though it actually never breaks.
can be true—as seems plausible. What the view does rule out is that dispositions
may necessarily lack manifestations. It assumes that, in the relevant circumstances,
dispositions can be manifested.
The second immediate implication of the Possibility View is the following. If
x manifests a given disposition in an accessible possible world, then x has that
disposition in the evaluation world. This follows from the reflexivity of the
accessibility relation. The implication further entails:
(The sufficiency of manifestations thesis): If x actually manifests a disposition,
x actually has that disposition.
For instance, consider breakability. The sufficiency of manifestations thesis tells us
that if a glass actually breaks, then it is breakable.
Note that the sufficiency of manifestations thesis sets the Possibility View apart
from virtually all contemporary accounts of dispositional expressions.13 There is a
reason authors typically deny this sufficiency thesis: it clashes with their coarse-
grained picture of manifestations. Typically, breaking is regarded as the manifes-
tation of fragility. Yet not everything that breaks is fragile. Thus scholars submit
that manifesting fragility is not enough for something to count as fragile—pace the
sufficiency of manifestations thesis. So why does the Possibility View endorse this
thesis?
This is important. Instead of discharging the sufficiency of manifestations thesis,
the defender of the Possibility View chooses to discharge something else instead. On
the faces of cases like fragility, she concludes that we need a more fine-grained
account of manifestations. For example, since not everything that breaks is fragile,
for the defender of the Possibility View the manifestation of fragility is not breaking,
but a more fine-grained event, such as the event of breaking easily.14 Accordingly,
she can accept that, if something manifests fragility (i.e. it breaks easily), it is
fragile. As a result, the Possibility View both preserves the sufficiency of
manifestations thesis and accounts for the semantic difference one finds between
adjectives such as ‘fragile’ and ‘breakable’. These two adjectives differ in meaning
13 For some of the most explicit denials of the sufficiency of manifestations thesis, in connection with
dispositions such as fragility and irascibility, see Vetter (2015: 70ff), Manley and Wasserman (2008:
74ff), and Fara (2005). Counterfactual accounts of DAs deny the thesis in virtue of their equating DAs
with restricted necessity claims.
14 This paper assumes that breaking easily is a more specific event than breaking, in line with a neo-
Davidsonian event semantics.
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because they are associated with different manifestation events (for details, see
Sect. 6).
Finally, the Possibility View does not say that a disposition-bearer needs to have a
given disposition at the same time of its manifestation. Usually this is the case. Yet
in some cases it isn’t. Consider a flammable entity. Plausibly, the entity loses its
flammability while burning and turning into ashes. Its manifesting the disposition
shows that it had the disposition when the burning started to occur, but not that it
preserved the disposition while manifesting it. Similarly, some dead stars are still
visible to us: they manifest their visibility also after they cease to exist. So a
disposition-bearer does not have to always exist at the time in which the disposition
gets manifested. The Possibility View is compatible with scenarios of this kind.
3 The bare bones of the argument
The view that DAs express possibility has some intuitive plausibility, but remains
far from trivial. I put forward an extensive and novel argument for the view. My
argument consists of three main parts.
First, I offer reasons for considering the Possibility View a plausible one
(Sect. 4). I give a general argument for why one should think that DAs express
possibility. The argument takes the form of an inference to the best explanation.
Here is its general form: within embedded contexts, the affirmation (or denial) of a
DA appears to entail a given possibility claim, and vice versa. The simplest
explanation of this phenomenon is that DAs express possibility. So we have reason
to conclude that DAs express possibility.
Having established that the Possibility View is worth pursuing, I develop it in
more detail. I look at how DAs interact with context (Sect. 5), at what kind of
possibility claim is to be associated with a given DA (Sect. 6), and at how to
accommodate the gradability of dispositional adjectives (Sect. 8). Along the way, I
compare and contrast the view with views in its vicinity (Sects. 7–8).
Finally, I consider how the context-sensitivity and pragmatics of DAs allow one
to deal with apparent counterexamples (Sect. 9).
4 A warm-up argument for the view
Let us begin by considering how DAs behave within both conjunctive claims and
embedded contexts. For instance, consider the following claims:
(5) # The glass is not breakable, but it can be broken.
(6) # The block of marble is not fragile, but it can be broken easily.
In at least many contexts, both (5) and (6) sound infelicitous. Prima facie, they
appear to involve some sort of contradiction.15
Let me give you one such context for (6):
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Context for (6). There is a block of marble in front of a child and his mum, in
their house (the parents are artists). The child says: ‘‘The block of marble is
not fragile, but it can be broken easily!’’ He then tries to break the block with
his bare hands.
In this context it would be appropriate to tell the child that his sentence is not a
happy one, because fragile objects can be broken easily. But then here (6) is
infelicitous.
One can contrast this with claims such as:
(7) If the glass were hit it would not break, but it can be broken.
(8) If the block were hit it would not break, but it can be broken easily.
These claims sound perfectly felicitous in several contexts. Here is one such context
for (8):
Context for (8). The block is made of marble and really hard to break. But
there is a sledge hammer at hand.
In this context, one could easily imagine someone saying: ‘‘This block is not fragile,
but it can be broken easily: I’ll show you with my sledge hammer!’’. So here (8) is
felicitous.
These data suggest two things. First, they suggest that there is a semantic distance
between the counterfactual claims contained in (7)–(8) and the DAs contained in
(5)–(6). This supports once again the idea that DAs are not semantically close to
counterfactual claims.16
Second, on the assumption that the modals ‘can’ and ‘it is possible for’ both
express possibility, the infelicity of (5)–(6) suggests the following. Each of the
DAs contained in, respectively, (5) and (6) implies the denial of the correspond-
ing overt possibility claim contained in (5) and (6), respectively. For instance, the
claim that the glass is fragile appears to imply that the glass can be broken easily. If
so, this claim contradicts (5)’s overt possibility claim, according to which the glass
cannot be broken easily. Hence, (5) sounds infelicitous. This picture provides us
with a reason to think that DAs imply possibility claims.
The linguistic data we just appealed to apply cross-linguistically. I will focus on
French and Spanish. Consider the sentences corresponding to the translation of (5)–
(6) in French and Spanish, respectively:
(5-i) # Le verre n’est pas cassable [or: le verre est incassable], mais il peut eˆtre
casse´.
15 Contextual shifts mid-sentence may of course allow for conversational contexts in which (5)–(6) are
felicitous even if both conjuncts are possibility claims—see Sect. 5.
16 Consider also negation. If I say that this rock isn’t breakable, I don’t say that it doesn’t necessarily
break. I say that it is not possible for it to break. Similarly, if I say that this rock is not fragile, I don’t say
that it does not necessarily break easily; I say that it is not possible for it to break easily. On the
assumption that counterfactuals express restricted necessities, these data also prove a semantic divergence
between DAs and counterfactual claims.
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(5-ii) # El vaso no es rompible, pero se puede romper [or, more literally: puede
ser roto].17
(6-i) # Le bloc n’est pas fragile, mais il peut eˆtre facilement casse´.
(6-ii) # El bloque no es fra´gil, pero se puede romper fa´cilmente.
Just like (5)–(6), each of (5-i)–(6-ii) is infelicitous in many contexts.18
Similarly, consider the following translations of (7)–(8) in French and Spanish,
respectively:
(7-i) Si l’on percutait le verre, il ne se casserait pas, mais il peut eˆtre casse´.
(7-ii) Si le pega´ramos, el vaso no se romperı´a, pero se puede romper.
(8-i) Le bloc ne se casserait pas si on le percutait, mais il peut eˆtre casse´
facilement.
(8-ii) Si le pega´ramos, el bloque no se romperı´a, pero se puede romper.
These sentences also appear felicitous in many contexts. This reinforces the
suggestion that DAs are semantically distant from counterfactual claims, and that
there is an implication from DAs to corresponding possibility claims.
Further embedded contexts also support the implication in the other direction,
namely the implication from a possibility claim to a given DA. Consider the
following claims:
(9) Since it is possible for it to be broken, this glass is breakable.
(10) Since this glass can be broken easily, it is fragile.
Each of (9)–(10) sounds felicitous in several contexts. Here is one such context for
(10):
Context for (10) We are at a crystal exhibition and a mum is looking at a fine
glass. Here 6 years old child is on her side. The child asks: ‘‘Why did the tour-
guide say that this glass is fragile?’’
It seems that in this context it would be perfectly appropriate for the mum to answer
her child thus: ‘‘The tour-guide said that this glass is fragile because it can break
easily. Since the glass can break easily, it is fragile’’. But then in this context (10) is
felicitous.
One way of explaining the felicity of (9)–(10) is to suggest that each of these
claims relies on there being an implication. The fact that (9) is felicitous suggests
that the claim that it is possible for the glass to be broken implies that the glass is
breakable. The fact that (10) is felicitous suggests that the claim that the glass can be
broken easily implies the claim that the glass is fragile. Nor is it is difficult to think
17 I use the intransitive construction in Spanish because Spanish native speakers tell me they find
themselves more inclined to use of this construction over the passive one. Note that the passive
construction entails the corresponding intransitive construction here.
18 Further romance languages can be used to confirm the point in the main text. Note that the most
natural translation of breakability-ascriptions in Italian involves a modal auxiliary (‘it is breakable’
translates: ‘si puo´ rompere’), which also provides support for the Possibility View. Apart from this
translation point, Italian data also further confirm what we get with English, French and Spanish.
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of further types of embedded contexts which point towards the same conclusion.19
This supports the idea that possibility claims imply DAs.
Once again, the data are not confined to the English language. The same applies
for instance to the corresponding sentences in French and Spanish:
(9-i) Puisque ce verre peut eˆtre casse´, il est cassable.
(9-ii) Dado que se puede romper, este vaso es rompible.
(10-i) Puisque ce verre peut eˆtre casse´ facilement, il est fragile.
(10-ii) Dado que se puede romper fa´cilmente, este vaso es fra´gil.
These sentences also appear felicitous in many contexts, and thus give us further
reasons for assuming that possibility claims imply DAs.
As a result, conjunctive claims and embedded contexts support the view that
there is a biconditional implication between a given DA and a corresponding
possibility claim. There is then reason to think that DAs simply express possibility.
No doubt, there might be other explanations of why the claims just given sound
(in)felicitous. But other things being equal, the Possibility View is worth pursuing.
5 Context-sensitivity and modal bases
Having established that the Possibility View deserves attention, let us now develop it
further. As we have seen in Sect. 2, the view relies on the idea that DAs are assessed
by quantifying over a given set of possible worlds. But which worlds?
Just like for standard possibility modals—such as ‘it is possible for…’,
‘possibly…’, and ‘can’—the context determines at least in part what possible
worlds we take into account for assessing a modal claim in the given context. That
is, it selects salient features that need to be kept fixed in all the accessible worlds.
Call the set of these worlds the modal base.20
19 Consider the following claim: ‘Although this glass can be broken, it is unbreakable’. The claim sounds
infelicitous. Plausibly, this is because ‘this glass is unbreakable’ implies ‘this glass cannot be broken’,
which contradicts ‘this glass can be broken’. A similar explanation would account for the infelicity of
‘Although this glass is unbreakable, it can be broken’. One obtains similar results with claims involving
‘because’.
20 I do not assume that context-dependency is always fully resolved in actual contexts (cf. Kratzer: 2013,
197–198). Formally, moreover, one can implement the context-sensitivity mechanism in different ways.
The current most influential framework has been developed by Kratzer (1977, 1981, 1991, 2012, 2013)
and implemented by Hacquard (2006, 2010), inter alia. It takes context to determine not only what must
be kept fixed in the relevant worlds (the modal base) but also to impose an ordering on these worlds via a
function (the ordering source) which arranges them in terms of closeness to a contextually determined set
of propositions (the ideal). The ordering source primarily aims at dealing with comparative sentences,
and has been called into question—especially (but not only) in connection with epistemic modals (Portner
2009; Yalcin 2007, 2010; Lassiter 2011, 2017, inter alia). The remarks in the present section are relevant
to the individuation of the modal base. Note that dispositional adjectives do not act as epistemic modals,
since the relevant modal base is circumstantial: a set of salient circumstances has to hold in each world
included in the modal base.
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One should not assume that, for a given context, the modal base of a given DA
will always be the same as the modal base of another corresponding possibility
claim. Consider:
(11) The glass is fragile.
(12) The glass can be broken easily.
It is easy to conceive of conversational contexts in which the following claims can
be interpreted as referring to the same glass, and are both possibility claims. Yet,
they interact with context slightly differently.
To see that DAs can interact with context differently from other possibility
claims, let’s look at a couple of examples. Assume the following scenario:
Special Substance. There is a glass whose material breaks under no
circumstances. Next to the glass there is a special substance. If one puts it
on the glass, it modifies the material of the glass, and makes the glass easy to
break. It is possible to put the substance on the glass.
One could truly say: ‘‘The glass can be broken easily: you just need to put the
special substance on it!’’. Here, in order to assess whether a glass is fragile, we look
at worlds which keep fixed the actual intrinsic features of the glass. But in order to
assess whether the glass can be broken easily, we also look at possible worlds in
which some actual properties of the glass get modified. So (11) comes out false, and
(12) true.
Now assume the following instead:
Box. There is a cup made of glass in a sealed box which makes it impossible
for someone to break the glass.
One could say: ‘‘Although the glass inside the box is fragile, the box makes it
impossible for us to break the glass’’. In the given context, when assessing whether a
glass is fragile one only considers possible worlds in which a glass is not in the box;
whereas in assessing whether the glass can be broken one also considers worlds in
which the glass is in the box. But then, (11) comes out true, and (12) false.21
Moreover, what specific restrictions we pose on the modal base varies not only
from context to context, but also from one dispositional adjective to another. For
some DAs, the relevant reading is often one on which the accessible worlds mostly
preserve some of the intrinsic features the disposition-bearer has in the evaluation
world, while allowing for maximal variation in external circumstances. For
instance, claims involving ‘fragile’, such as
(13) Mummy’s vase is fragile.
are often assessed against a modal base that keeps the structural properties of the
vase fixed, and allows for a relatively maximal variation in external circumstances.
21 Often the denial of DAs is simply devoted to stress the prevention of external agency. Adjectives such
as ‘washable’, ‘disposable’ and ‘stoppable’ work just like ‘breakable’ in this respect.
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However, consider a dispositional adjective like ‘visible’. One can easily imagine
a touristic guide saying: ‘‘On a sunny day, the mountain is visible’’. In this context,
whether a mountain is visible depends, among other things, on whether it is a sunny
day or not. So the claim
(14) The mountain is visible.
is assessed by looking at worlds in which the atmospheric conditions are the same as
they are in the world of evaluation.22 Similarly, consider:
(15) The target is vulnerable.
Whether a military target is vulnerable depends at least in part on external factors,
such as the target’s location. So we assess (15) by looking at worlds in which the
target’s location is the same as in the world of evaluation.
As a result, the context-sensitivity of DAs, just like that of modal claims in
general, is extremely flexible. Different modal claims can be assessed in accordance
with different modal bases within one and the same context of utterance. Moreover,
the determination of the modal base depends both on the dispositional adjective in
question and on further features of the context of utterance.
6 Fine-grained manifestations
So far, we have seen that something is F-able just in case it is possible for it to
manifest that disposition. One question the Possibility View still needs to address is
how exactly one should individuate the possibility associated with a given DA. In
other words, we need to say more about what the manifestation of a given
disposition is.
The literature on dispositions generally assumes a coarse-grained picture of
manifestations. It takes manifestations to be sufficiently characterized by a verb
alone.23 For instance, the manifestation of fragility is supposed to be exhaustively
denoted by ‘breaking’, which in turn is taken to denote the event of breaking.
Similarly, the manifestation of irascibility is supposed to be exhaustively
characterized by ‘getting angry’, which in turn denotes the event of getting angry.
To my knowledge, the coarse-grained picture of manifestations goes undefended
in the current debate. Nor does it have a long tradition. Aristotle, for instance,
thought that the property of being soft is a disposition (in the contemporary sense of
the term), and that the manifestation of this disposition is being cut easily
(Categories, 9a27-9). On this alternative picture, the manifestation of the disposition
is being cut in an easy way, and its characterization includes a qualification of the
verb, namely the qualification ‘easily’.
22 Accepting that, say, ‘visible’ is a dispositional adjective does not by itself settle whether one should
admit of extrinsic dispositions in one’s metaphysics, and how to account for them. For an account of
extrinsic dispositions, see McKitrick (2003); for skepticism, see Park (2017).
23 Cf. Mackie (1977), Lewis (1997a), Manley and Wassermann (2007, 2008) and Vetter (2014, 2015),
inter alia.
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Let us generalize this thought. Call a fine-grained picture of manifestations a
picture on which the manifestation of a disposition is in some cases best
individuated by means of expressions that include qualifications of the verb, such as
for instance adverbial qualifications. For instance, the manifestation of fragility is
being broken easily; the manifestation of breakability, on the other hand, is
successfully characterized merely by ‘being broken’. So manifestations can be
events which are more fine-grained than it is usually assumed. I shall now argue that
the correct account of DAs has to assume the fine-grained picture of manifestations,
and the coarse-grained picture is to be dismissed.
First, consider again the argument from embedded contexts given in Sect. 4.
Among other things, the argument gives us a reason to assume that claims such as
the ones below, at least in some contexts, imply one another:
(16) N is fragile.
(17) N can be broken easily.
This suggests that the manifestation of fragility should be characterized with a
verbal expression in its passive form.24 It also begins to provide us with reason for
thinking that the qualification ‘easily’ is relevant to the characterization of the
manifestation of fragility.
Now let us take a closer look at (17). This claim actually contains two verbal
expressions: the modal ‘can’ and the expression that falls within the scope of the
modal, ‘be broken’. Can ‘easily’ modify either of them? Some authors suggest that
‘easily’ can modify modals.25 I think there might be ground for skepticism here,
especially in connection with circumstantial modality. But for present purposes I
focus on making a narrower claim. My claim is this: (16) and (17) imply each other
in many contexts, provided we take ‘easily’ to modify ‘being broken’.
Let me give some general reasons for accepting that ‘easily’ can modify verbs
that fall within the scope of a modal. I do not expect this point to be controversial.
But given that it is crucial for my purposes, it is worth giving it explicit support.
Consider how ‘easily’ coordinates with other adverbs that cannot modify a modal,
such as ‘quickly’:
(18) The glass can be broken quickly and easily.
Coordination typically only works when you are coordinating things of the same
type. (18) is felicitous, so in this case coordination works. This suggests that here
both adverbs modify the same item, namely ‘be broken’, and thus ‘easily’ acts as a
manner adverb here.
24 Similarly, the manifestation of visibility is something like being seen; the manifestation of thinkability
is something like being thought; etc.
25 Vetter (2014, 2015: 70ff) suggests that there is a bi-implication between (16) and (17) when ‘easily’ is
interpreted as qualifying the modal ‘can’. I discuss her resulting semantics in Sect. 7, and show how my
account avoids the difficulties of Vetter’s in Sect. 8. For another account of how ‘easily’ may qualify
modals, see Klecha (2014a, b). Klecha (2012, 2014b: chapter 5) argues against the view that ‘possible’ is
gradable also within epistemic contexts—contra Lassiter (2011), inter alia—but claims it can nonetheless
be qualified by ‘easily’.
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Now consider this exchange:
‘‘That glass was fragile.’’
‘‘Why?’’
‘‘It broke easily.’’
Here ‘easily’ does not modify the modal—there is no modal for it to modify! This
gives us reason to assume that (16) correlates with (17) when the later interpreted in
such a way that ‘easily’ modifies ‘break’. But then, we have a reason to conclude
that ‘being broken’ is not a correct characterization of the manifestation of fragility.
To characterize this manifestation correctly, we need a more specific expression,
such as ‘being broken easily’—where ‘easily’ gets precisified by context and often
means, roughly, ‘under little impact force’ (cf. Sect. 8).
The point extends to other dispositional adjectives. Consider:
(19) The task is feasible.
Roughly, something is feasible just in case it can be accomplished with an
acceptable amount of effort. So the manifestation of feasibility is something like:
being accomplished with an acceptable amount of effort. More generally, the
manifestation of a disposition is often best characterized not merely by means of a
verb, but a verb together with some qualification. The resulting expression picks up
a more specific event than the event denoted by the verb alone. So some dispositions
have fine-grained manifestations.
Note that the fine-grained picture of manifestations indirectly supports the
Possibility View. The coarse-grained picture does not fit well together with an
immediate implication of the view, namely the sufficiency of manifestations
thesis—the thesis that actually manifesting a disposition is sufficient for possessing
it (cf. Sect. 2.1). When joined with a coarse-grained picture of manifestations, the
sufficiency of manifestations thesis yields bad results. For instance, on the
assumption that breaking is the manifestation of fragility, the sufficiency of
manifestations implies that if something breaks, it is fragile. Yet a bull-dozer’s
breaking that a block of marble doesn’t seem to warrant the conclusion that the
block is fragile.26 So one should not endorse the sufficiency of manifestations thesis
and a coarse-grained picture of manifestations together.
Now, when joined together with the sufficiency of manifestations thesis, the fine-
grained picture of manifestations yields good results. For instance, it tells us that, at
least in many contexts, if something gets broken easily, then it is fragile—as seems
plausible. Since the fine-grained picture of manifestations is independently
motivated, this further supports the Possibility View itself.27
26 Similarly, getting angry is taken to be the manifestation of irascibility. But the fact that Gandhi got
angry once (let’s suppose) does not seem to show that he was irascible.
27 Note also that since the Possibility View assumes a fine-grained account of manifestations, it can
explain why fragility ascriptions, say, imply breakability ascriptions but not vice versa. Breakability and
fragility have different manifestations: the manifestation of breakability is the event of being broken, and
the manifestation of fragility is the event of being broken easily. On the assumption that getting broken
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7 Comparison with (some) alternative views
Having stated the central claims of the Possibility View, it can be useful to compare
and contrast it with other views that do not attempt at reducing disposition ascriptions
to DAs. In particular, there are two main alternatives to the standard counterfactual
picture that lie somewhat in the vicinity of the Possibility View: Manley and
Wassermann (2007, 2008)’s, and Vetter (2014, 2015)’s. This section looks at each of
these views, and clarifies where and why the Possibility View differs.
7.1 Manley and Wassermann (2008)
Manley and Wassermann (2008) offer an account of expressions of the form ‘x is
disposed to u’ while taking some distance from counterfactual accounts:
(MW) ‘x is disposed to u’ is true iff x would u in some suitable proportion of
C-cases.
where a C-case is a sufficiently specific possible scenario, and the context
determines the threshold for suitability—namely, in how many scenarios x has to
manifest the disposition in order to possess that disposition. For instance, an object
is disposed to break just in case it breaks in enough possible scenarios.
We have seen that expressions of the form ‘x is disposed to u’ fall beyond the
scope of this paper. But one can extend Manley and Wasserman’s view to DAs in
the following way:
(MW’) ‘x is F-able’ is true iff x would u in some suitable proportion of
C-cases.
Here ‘C’ picks up the stimulus-conditions for the manifestation of a disposition. For
instance, in the case of fragility C-cases are cases in which n is stressed. Moreover,
the suitable proportion of C-cases is established by context.
The Possibility View differs from (MW’) in a number of ways. First, (MW’)
assumes that, at least for many dispositions, it is possible to specify a clear and
extrinsic stimulus conditions that trigger the manifestation of a given disposition.
For instance, fragility requires referring to stress conditions of a given sort.28 The
Possibility View does not assume that there are extrinsic conditions for the
manifestation of a disposition that can be independently specified.
Second, (MW’) claims that the modal force of a DA varies with context—the
context allegedly tells us in how many possible worlds a manifestation has to occur
for the DA to be true. Among other things, this threatens to make a DA
ambiguous—in some contexts it may stand for a necessity claim, in others for a
possibility clams, and yet in others for something in between.29 By contrast, the
Footnote 27 continued
easily is a way of getting broken, the fact that it is possible to break easily implies that it is possible to
break (and not vice versa). But then, if something is fragile, it is breakable (and not vice versa).
28 For objections to this assumption, see Vetter (2011, 2014, 2015).
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Possibility View endorses a more straightforwardly unitary account of DAs, since it
takes all these claim to be equivalent to possibility claims.
Third, (MW’) so far lacks a necessary ingredient: it does not tell us how worlds
are to be counted. Yet it appeals to a kind of quantification that requires for
something to hold in a relevant proportion of accessible worlds. Thus to fully
complete (MW’) a criterion for counting worlds would need to be provided. The
Possibility View, on the other hand, does not need to provide such a criterion.
Finally, Manley and Wasserman assume the coarse-grained picture of manifes-
tations. They preserve for instance the standard assumption that the manifestation of
fragility is sufficiently described by the associated verb, and thus amounts to an
event of breaking. Accordingly, they deny the sufficiency of manifestations thesis.
By contrast, the Possibility View opts for a fine-grained picture of manifestations
and endorses the sufficiency of manifestations thesis (cf. Sects. 2.1 and 6). We have
already given reasons for preferring a fine-grained picture of manifestations (Sect.
6). We shall also see later that the endorsement of a coarse-grained picture of
manifestations can lead to a problematic account of the gradability of dispositional
adjectives (Sect. 8.1).
7.2 Vetter (2014, 2015)
Vetter (2014, 2015) posits two classes of DAs. DAs such as ‘the glass is breakable’,
she says, are possibility claims—just like the Possibility View says. Yet other DAs,
such as ‘the vase is fragile’ and ‘Socrates is irascible’, have a stronger modal force:
x is fragile simpliciter just in case it breaks in a sufficiently large proportion of
the relevant possible worlds, where context may determine what counts as
sufficiently large. (2015: 73)
That is:
(V) ‘x is fragile’ is true iff x breaks in a few possible worlds.
Here context determines both the domain of quantification and the modal force
denoted by ‘a few’—in at least how many worlds a has to break to count as fragile.
Now (V) is remarkably close to (MW’). One difference is that for Vetter the
relevant threshold is always relatively close to—but not identical with—the
threshold of possibility, rather than necessity. So on her account the number of
29 To avoid ambiguity, one may either (i) try and develop this view by suggesting that the modal force of
dispositional adjectives is a free variable to be saturated by context, or (ii) embrace polysemy. On (i), the
interaction with context of these modals works like that of ‘that’: they have a different content in different
contexts, but somehow the same sort of character. I know of no such developed account, and I am
skeptical about its prospects. The main challenge for such a view would be to give a plausible story about
how to distinguish character and context for modals. On (ii), a dispositional adjective becomes a single
lexical item with many related senses. This amounts to accepting that many dispositional adjectives
involve a weak form of ambiguity. Viebahn and Vetter (2016) propose polysemy for ‘may’ and ‘can’.
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worlds in which something has to break to count as fragile is always relatively
low.30
The Possibility View differs from Vetter’s in three main ways. First, Vetter does
not offer a fully unified account of DAs. She posits two classes of DA, and adds that
the second class of DAs is not equivalent to standard possibility claims—contrary to
what the Possibility View says. Just like (MW’), then, this view threatens to posit an
ambiguity amongst DAs, in that it claims that the modal force of the second set of
DAs is ultimately context-dependent.31
Second, Vetter’s understanding of manifestations sides yet again with the
standard assumption that these manifestations are best characterized merely by a
verb, and accepts that the manifestation of a disposition of fragility just is the event-
type of breaking. As we have seen, however, a fine-grained account of manifestation
is ultimately preferable (Sect. 6).
Third, Vetter’s view requires certain conditions to hold in a large proportion of
relevant possible worlds. To be complete the view would have to tell us how exactly
the worlds are to be counted, both in finite and infinite domains. On this view, when
assessing DAs such as fragility claims we have to conclude that the claim is true in
case the object breaks in a sufficiently large proportion of relevant worlds. Even
accepting that context has a role to play here, one cannot apply the view without
criterion for counting worlds. By contrast, the Possibility View simply appeals to
existential quantification over possible worlds.
To sum up, the Possibility View offers a more unified and straightforward
account of DAs than its closer alternatives. It also endorses a different and
independently motivated picture of manifestations. Moreover, in the next section
I show that the differences between the Possibility View and these alternatives allow
my view to better account for the gradability of dispositional adjectives.
8 The gradability of dispositional adjectives
Gradability is the linguistic phenomenon whereby adjectives can be naturally
modified by qualitative modifiers such as ‘more’, ‘less’ and ‘very’, and appear in
comparative clauses. Thus ‘green’ is a gradable adjective, since it can appear in
comparative clauses, as in:
(20) This leaf is greener than that one.
Several dispositional adjectives are gradable too. They can appear in comparative
clauses, as in:
(21) This vase is more fragile than that one.
(22) I am more irascible than you are.
30 Vetter (2015: 73ff).
31 One may try to avoid ambiguity by pursuing either polysemy or indexicality. Since Vetter accepts that
‘can’ and ‘may’ involve polysemy—in Viebahn and Vetter (2016)—she would probably extend polysemy
to dispositional adjectives.
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They can also be qualified with ‘very’, ‘extremely’, ‘incredibly’, etc.
Gradability is hotly debated amongst linguists at the moment. What tends to be
accepted is that accounting for the gradability of property ascribing adjectives
requires one to specify an ordering. Along that ordering, one calculates the degree to
which an entity has the property, and how the degree gets fixed (cf. Klein:
1980, 1991; Kennedy and McNally 2005). For example, one can account for
(23) Tom is taller than Jim,
by specifying the degree of Tom’s and Jim’s tallness along the ordering of height. If
on that ordering Tom’s degree of tallness is higher than Jim’s, (23) is true.32
The individuation of an ordering appears to be difficult for DAs, however. What
is the relevant ordering for ‘fragile’, for example? This seems unclear. Some views
about the gradability of dispositional adjectives have appeared within the
dispositions debate (Manley and Wassermann 2007, 2008; Vetter 2014, 2015). In
what follows, I argue that these accounts are problematic (Sect. 8.1). Then I show
that, given the Possibility View, the account of the gradability of non-dispositional
adjectives can be extended to dispositional adjectives in a straightforward way
(Sect. 8.2).
8.1 Current accounts
The most developed accounts of the gradability of dispositional adjectives have
been put forward precisely by Manley and Wassermann (2007, 2008) and Vetter
(2014, 2015), the authors who put forward the closest alternatives to the Possibility
View. As far as gradability goes, their two accounts are remarkably alike.
Manley and Wassermann suggest:
x is more disposed to M when C than y iff x would M in more C-cases than
y. (2007: 72ff; 2008: 17)
For instance, a is more fragile than b just in case a breaks when struck in more
C-cases than b, where C-cases are relevant possible scenarios selected by context.
Similarly, Vetter writes:
x is more fragile than y just in case x breaks in more of the relevant worlds
than y. (2015: 73)
So: x is more fragile than y just in case there are more scenarios in which x breaks
than scenarios in which y breaks.
Vetter gives us more details about how to think about possible scenarios than
Manley and Wasserman. I will focus on discussing her version of this account of
gradability. She suggests:
32 Scholars often talk about a scale, rather than an ordering (cf. Klein 1980, 1991; Kennedy and McNally
2005, 2010, inter alia). But strictly speaking to get gradability one only needs an ordering, and not a
metric. Plausibly, some adjectives should be associated merely with an ordering rather than a metric,
since not for every gradable adjective F one can say things like ‘a is twice as F as b’. In the main text, I
talk about orderings, and assume that scales are special cases thereof.
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To get the proportions right, we should quantify not over worlds but over cases
or centered worlds: triples of a world, a time, and an object. An irascible
person will typically get angry any number of times within one world, and a
transmissible disease will typically be transmitted more than once. What
should determine the proportion that makes a person count as irascible, or a
disease as transmissible, is not the number of worlds in which the person
becomes angry at least once or the disease transmitted at least once, but rather
the number of individual instances of anger or transmission: in other words, of
cases (2015: 77).
The idea is simple enough: x is more fragile than y just in case, for a given context
of utterance, x breaks in more centered worlds than y does. In general, for a
dispositional adjective ‘F-able’, x is more F-able than y just in case x u-es in more
centered worlds than y.
Yet, I submit that this account of gradability is problematic. Assume the
following scenario:
R-bulls and G-bulls. R-Bulls get angry when they see something green. They
also get angry when they see something red. G-bulls behave just like r-bulls
under all circumstances, except when they see something green; the sight of
green instantly kills them.33
Now consider the claim
(24) R-bulls are as irascible as g-bulls.
Given our scenario, Vetter’s account predicts that (24) is false. There are more
centered worlds in which r-bulls get angry than centered worlds in which g-bulls get
angry. R-bulls get angry in the centered worlds in which they only see something
green. But g-bulls cannot survive in these centered worlds. Hence, r-bulls are more
irascible than g-bulls.
Yet, strictly speaking, the issue of whether they are as irascible as r-bulls seems
to be open. The question of whether g-bulls are as irascible as r-bulls is, at the very
least, intelligible and not trivial. One could imagine a group of biologists who takes
up this research question, and tries to find out whether g-bulls are more irascible
than r-bulls. So the truth of (24) should not be rejected out of hand by our
semantics—contrary to what the account says.
On the face of this difficulty, one might try to fix Vetter’s account in three main
ways. First, one could suggest that likelihoods are to be evaluated conditionally.
Given R-bulls and G-bulls, one has to assess (24) by considering the probability of
getting angry conditional on seeing, say, something red. The probability of an r-bull
getting angry on seeing something red is high. By definition, the probability of a
g-bull getting angry on seeing something red is also high. Accordingly, r-bulls turn
out to be as irascible as g-bulls.
One can understand the resulting view as saying that DAs are equivalent to
conditionals with probabilistic truth-conditions. On this view, g-bulls are irascible
33 The set-up is in many ways analogous to Kripke’s killer-yellow scenario—cf. Lewis (1997b: 344).
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just in case if they see something red, they get angry. This conditional is true just in
case, given the probability that g-bulls see something red, the probability that
g-bulls get angry is sufficiently high. But Vetter herself points out that
conditionalizing on triggering conditions yields unsatisfactory accounts of DAs
(cf. Vetter 2011, 2014, 2015: Sect. 2.2–2.6). Given that one wants to specify the
general ascription conditions for irascibility, it is implausible to suggest that
something is irascible just in case, if it sees something red, it gets angry. Surely,
redness is just one of many triggering conditions of irascibility. Nor can one say:
something is irascible just in case, if something makes it angry, it gets angry. For
this is trivial.
Alternatively, one may try to posit constraints on the domain of possible worlds
which are relevant for assessing a given DA. Perhaps, for every world in the domain
of quantification, the context keeps fixed the properties of an object which entail the
possession of the disposition, and allows for maximal variation otherwise. Thus: x is
F-able just in case, in a few of the worlds in which a has a set of properties which
entail the possession of F-ability, x is F-able. Yet, the resulting account makes (24)
true of necessity. For the account is trivial. Everything is such as to have a given
disposition in any world in which it has a set of properties which entail the
possession of the disposition.
Third, one might stipulate that the context allows us to keep (24) open. We thus
get: x is F-able just in case in a few of the worlds in which x preserves a given set of
properties, x u-es, where the relevant set of properties is determined by context in
such a way that one can predict the truth-value of (24) correctly.
As it stands, however, this view is ad hoc. It tells us that DAs interact with
context in a way which makes the truth-value of claims such as (24) come out right,
without giving us independent reasons to think that the context interacts with DAs in
the relevant way, nor further details about how the interaction with context is
supposed to go. It is unclear that any such account is available, and that it would
predict the needed results. In its absence, Vetter’s view has not been shown to
correctly capture the gradability of dispositional adjectives.
8.2 My account: gradable manifestations
Let us take stock. So far, we have seen that a challenge for a view about DAs is to
offer an account of the gradability of dispositional adjectives. We have also seen
that the main account of their gradability in the literature are problematic. I will now
put forward an alternative account of the gradability of dispositional adjectives.
Other things being equal, it is desirable to capture the gradability of all gradable
adjectives in a unified way. Accordingly, it is worth aiming at extending the
framework already in use to account for adjectives like ‘tall’ and ‘green’ to
dispositional adjectives too. As we have seen, on these accounts gradability
specifies the degree to which an entity possesses a given property is measured
against a contextually determined ordering. To extend such an account to
dispositional adjectives, one needs to explain how to individuate their orderings.
Interestingly enough, the characterization of manifestations endorsed by the
Possibility View allows one to individuate an ordering for dispositional adjectives in
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a straightforward way. We now know that DAs like fragility ascriptions require us
to include some qualification of the verb used to characterize the manifestation of a
given disposition. Say, something is fragile just in case it is possible for it to be
broken easily (cf. Sect. 6).
Now the qualifications of the verb that are part of the characterization of the
manifestation of certain dispositions can be gradable. For instance, ‘easily’ is
gradable: one can do things more or less easily, say. This allows us to determine the
ordering in play in comparison clauses involving dispositional adjectives. For
instance, in a context in which ‘easily’ means the same as ‘with little impact force’,
x is more fragile than y just in case x can break with less impact force than y.34
Similarly, consider ‘feasible’. Its manifestation contains some qualification –
something like ‘with little effort’, where what counts as little effort is a context-
sensitive matter. This allows us to determine the ordering in play in comparison
clauses involving feasibility: x is more feasible than y just in case x can be
accomplished with less effort than y.
Generally put, qualifications on the manifestation-verb account for the fact that
dispositional adjectives are gradable. This is because the gradability of a
dispositional adjective depends on the gradability of the manifestation associated
with the relevant disposition. The more an object can break easily, the more fragile
it is. The more a task may can get accomplished with little effort, the more feasible
it is. The degree to which something possesses a disposition depends on the degree
to which it manifests the disposition in the relevant manifestation-world(s).35 In a
slogan: dispositions are gradable because they have gradable manifestations. So one
can measure the degree to which something has a disposition in term of the degree
to which it manifests the disposition in the manifestation-world(s).36
Now consider a claim of the form:
(27) x is more fragile than y.
Given what we have just seen, the claim is true just in case x manifests fragility
more than y. Manifesting fragility amounts to breaking easily, where what qualifies
as to breaking easily is context-sensitive. Suppose we are in a context where
34 This explains why it is more natural to grade a dispositional adjective like ‘fragile’ than an adjective
like ‘breakable’. When ‘breakable’ also appears in gradable constructions, this is because we grade
breakability by using an ordering that relies on features of the manifestation, being broken.
35 The account can thus be developed further by building on current accounts of how to measure and
compare events—see Wellwood et al. (2012) for an overview. See also Wellwood (2015) for an account
of gradable predicates that maps them to degrees of events or states.
36 Formally, one can regiment this picture in different ways. One may try to appeal to Kratzer’s ordering
source (introduced in Kratzer 1981, 1991, 2012). If so, the gradability of claims such as ‘x is more likely
to break than y’ might be accounted for in terms of degrees of closeness to an ideal set by context—
roughly, ‘x is more likely to break than y’ just in case at least one possible world in which x breaks easily
is closer to the ideal than any world in which y breaks easily. However, note that the ideal would also
have to encode that breaking under less impact force leads to a higher ranking (for an account of modal
comparisons that encodes some higher-order information of this sort in the ideal, see Katz et al. 2012; Silk
2017). Alternatively, one might order words without appealing to an ideal. What one needs here is a
contextually-determined standard of comparison that gives us an ordering of the relevant possible worlds,
and a function that tells us how to establish whether x has a given disposition to a higher degree than y.
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breaking easily means to break under an impact force that is equal to or lower than
2N. I suggest that in this context (27) is true just in case there is a relevant possible
world in which x breaks under less impact force than y breaks in any of the relevant
possible worlds.
We are now in a position to re-consider the objection I put forward against
Vetter’s account, the R-bulls and G-bulls case. As we have seen, this objection
brings out how Vetter does not properly account for the gradability of ‘irascible’.
Her view wrongly rules out that g-bulls and r-bulls are equally irascible. Does my
account do better?
I submit that it does. On the Possibility View, as we have just seen, the gradability
of the manifestation of a disposition transfers to the disposition itself. Thus we can
account for the r-bulls and g-bulls case as follows: a g-bull is more irascible than an
r-bull just in case it can get angry with a weaker provocation than an r-bull. Here
what counts as a weak provocation is a context-sensitive matter. This account does
not deny out of hand that g-bulls and r-bulls are equally irascible. Moreover, on the
account it is likely to turn out to be true, for many contexts, that g-bulls and r-bulls
are equally irascible. This seems to be the correct result.
9 Two possible objections
9.1 Soft spots
Objection. One may take cases like the following to be a problem for my account:
Soft Spot. A concrete block withstands heavy forces. Yet, it has one soft spot.
At a particular corner, it is very easy to break. There, little force will do.37
In this scenario,
(28) The block is not fragile.
seems true. Yet, the block could be broken easily at the corner. So, on the Possibility
View, (28) comes out false.38
Reply. The objection is too quick. The following claim
(29) I can walk through the wall.
seems false. Yet, quantum mechanics tells us it is physically possible for me to walk
through a wall, under ordinary conditions. The probability that this happens is
incredibly low. Nonetheless, it is a possible event.
News from quantum mechanics could be taken as a reason for denying that (30)
is ever false. Or, more plausibly, one can assume that when we assessing (30) we
usually do not consider worlds in which I walk through a wall. There are in fact
37 This case is similar to one given by Manley and Wassermann (2008: 67).
38 Vetter (2015: 10) takes this case to support her account of DAs—but see Sects. 7.2 and 8.1.
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contexts in which we do take this sort of world into account. For instance: ‘‘I
thought I could not go through the wall; but quantum mechanics taught me that this
is possible, after all!’’. Here, the worlds in which the speaker goes through the wall
are accessible.
Something similar happens with Soft Spot. Typically, when we assess the claim
that the block is not fragile, (29), we ignore the scenario in which the block gets hit
at the relevant corner. Accordingly, we conclude that the block cannot get broken
with little force, and take the block not to be fragile. There are, however, contexts in
which we do not ignore this scenario. Consider a speaker who says: ‘‘You know
what? I found out that this block is fragile: it can be broken very easily on that
corner!’’. Plausibly, in this conversation the speaker considers the scenario in which
the block gets broken easily. So she concludes that the block is fragile after all. This
judgment seems very natural. This creates at least a presumption that, in some
contexts, our block is correctly described as fragile.
Consider also the following scenario:
Softer Spot. The block breaks under exactly the same conditions stated in Soft
Spot: it breaks only if hit in a specific way in the right bottom corner. Yet it is
situated among people who very often hit blocks in their right-bottom corner
in the specific way that makes our block break. It’s natural for these people to
hit there, with that little force.
Given Softer Spot, (29) seems false. Yet, between Soft Spot and Softer Spot nothing
has changed in the breaking-conditions of the block. The block breaks easily at one
and only one point. What has changed is how likely it is that, in the given context,
the relevant breaking conditions hold. When we assess (29) against Soft Spot, we
tend to ignore far-fetched scenarios, such as the one in which the block gets broken
easily. But given Softer Spot, such a scenario is no more far-fetched.
I conclude that Soft Spot is not an objection to the Possibility View. It can be dealt
with by appealing to the context-sensitivity of DAs. Nonetheless, the case is
interesting in its own right. It raises questions about why we ignore certain
possibilities when assessing modal claims in general, an issue which extends to
necessity, counterfactual, and overt possibility claims, and deserves to be addressed
in a separate occasion.39
39 Two suggestions. (i) We often seem to ignore events which have a low probability to occur. The
probability that, in ordinary conditions, I walk through the wall is incredibly low. So usually in assessing
‘I can walk through the wall’ we ignore worlds in which this happens. Similarly, the probability that a
concrete block with a weak spot gets broken with little force is low. So in assessing the claim ‘the block is
not fragile’ we tend to ignore the only world in which the block gets broken in this way. (ii) Normality
seems often set not simply by objective frequency but also by practical considerations. We tend to
describe plates as fragile when doing things like moving them around by hand in the house (as distinct
from bombarding them with electrons in a lab). Lewis (2016) argues that considerations of this kind also
apply to the mechanism of context-sensitivity of counterfactual claims.
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9.2 Payable, honourable, despicable
Objection. Think of ‘payable’, ‘honourable’, and ‘despicable’. Their modal flavour
is typically deontic: they involve the modality what ought or is allowed to be the
case, rather than the circumstantial modality of what can or must be the case given
the circumstances.40 Worryingly, their modal force seems to be that of necessity: to
say that a tax is payable appears equivalent to saying that the tax has to be paid;
similarly, to describe a person as honourable sounds like to say that the person has
to be honoured; and a despicable act seems to be one that ought to be despised.
Accordingly,
(30) This tax is payable
(31) Your father is an honourable person
(32) The act is despicable
appear equivalent to necessity claims, and not to possibility claims—pace
the Possibility View.
Reply. I agree that the perceived modal strength of the dispositional adjectives
involved in (30)–(32) is often that of necessity, but disagree that (30)–(32) are
counterexamples to the Possibility View. Rather, I suggest, the perceived modal
strength is due to an implicature.
Although this is not the place to fully develop a technical account of the
pragmatics of DAs, the basic idea is not difficult to elucidate. For claims like (30)–
(32), I suggest, relevance can force us to ignore the possible scenarios in which the
disposition is not manifested.41 Consider (30), for example. Strictly speaking, a
payable tax is an unpaid tax which can be paid by us. Yet relevance usually makes
us ignore scenarios in which, say, we do not pay taxes. As a result, we interpret (30)
as conveying a necessity.42
Similarly, (31)–(32) strictly speaking tell us, respectively, that your father can be
(justifiably) honoured, and a given act can be (justifiably) despised. Yet relevance
can make us ignore, respectively, scenarios in which we don’t despise a despicable
act, and fail to praise the praiseworthy act. As a result, pragmatics leads us to
40 Just like other modals, some dispositional adjectives can preferably associate with modal flavours, and
which modal flavour this is varies among them. This is analogous to the fact that the modal ‘ought’ goes
with a deontic modal force (expressing what is necessarily the case given certain norms), for instance.
41 Bassi and Bar-Lev (forthcoming) defend a similar suggestion for conditionals—that when ‘If p, q’ and
‘If p, might q’ are perceived as equivalent, the perceived strength of the former conditional is due to an
implicature. I suspend judgement on whether Bassi and Bar-Lev’s account of conditional claims is
correct, but share their assumption that implicatures can lead us to interpret a claim involving existential
quantification as involving universal quantification instead.
42 It is worth drawing a connection with overt possibility claims: ‘I might pass on the wine’ can be a
polite way of saying ‘I will pass on the wine’, and ‘You may pay for parking up front’ a polite way of
saying ‘You must pay for parking up front’. This strengthening is clearly pragmatic in nature. Plausibly,
DAs undergo analogous phenomena. (Thank you to Matthew Mendelkern for the example.).
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interpret (31)–(32) as necessity claims. This is not a problem for the Possibility
View. On the contrary, the view has the merit of being able to give a unified account
of DAs, while also explaining why some DAs can apparently involve a different
modal force.
10 Conclusion
I conclude that DAs express possibility, as the Possibility View says. This view is
supported by embedded contexts. Moreover, since the manifestations of dispositions
can be graded, the view can account for the gradability of dispositional adjectives.
Furthermore, apparent counterexamples to the Possibility View can be explained
away by taking into account the context-sensitivity and pragmatics of DAs.
It will be interesting to see what implications this account has for the metaphysics
of dispositions. It will also be interesting to investigate whether expressions such as
generics (e.g. I jog, I smoke) and other property ascriptions (e.g. the car is fast) also
express possibility.43 But this is for another occasion.
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